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Between Truth and Provocation:
Reclaiming Reason in American Legal
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Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Beyond All Reason: The
Radical Assault on Truth in American Law. New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. 195. $25.00.
Francis J. Mootz H1*
I. DlfJA Vu, ALL OVER AGAIN
The only difference that I see is that you are exactly the same as
you used to be.
-The Wallflowers'
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. I am grateful to Dan
Farber, Nancy Levit, and Chris Iijima for their very helpful written comments and discussions;
to Cal Anderson, Dick Cole, Joan Mahoney, and Caren Senter for stimulating conversations
about this Book Review; and especially to Bruce Miller for wide-ranging conversations about
these and related topics. I wish to dedicate this Book Review to the memory of Bill Senter, who
had little patience for the politically correct cult of victimhood, but who was fascinated in his
own way by the implications that the theoretical questions surrounding "radical multiculturalism"
might hold for achieving the goal of a just society.
1. THE WALLFLOWERS, The Difference, on BRINGING DOWN THE HORSE (Interscope
Records 1996).
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Truth has regained a strong voice in American legal scholarship.
Like a groggy patient slowly emerging from a traumatic operation,
legal theory is being coaxed back to consciousness by Dan Farber and
Suzanna Sherry.' They are fighting the debilitating illness of radical
multiculturalism and its attendant relativism; they proclaim that the
cure can be found in the power of truth, the force of reason, and the
integrity of the word. Unfortunately, the patient is unlikely to recover
while in the care of Farber and Sherry, even though their operation
must be judged a success on its own terms. By equating "reason" with
"truth," Farber and Sherry make a diagnostic error that one might
expect from the country doctors who embrace right-wing legal
ideologies but which is unforgivable for such talented and level-
headed practitioners. Consequently, a tale foretold emerges from the
Oxford University Press as predictably as the changing season:
Rationality is deployed against emotional appeals, and truth is
championed against relativism. It's d6jA vu, all over again.
Farber and Sherry's attack on multiculturalism is only the most
recent manifestation of a conflict that began at the dawn of the
Western intellectual tradition in ancient Greece. The Sophists-a
group of itinerant, cosmopolitan, and irreverent teachers-gained
notoriety as the mythical-poetic, parochial, and aristocratic world of
Homeric Greece was giving way to the self-reflective, pan-Hellenic,
and democratic world exemplified by Periclean Athens.3 The Sophists
contributed to the breakdown in traditional social patterns by
demonstrating that all received wisdom can be challenged and
reversed with rhetorical critique. They were known for teaching the
skill of making the weaker argument appear stronger, which proved
to be a threat to the established order because it subjected every
dominant discourse to interrogation and potential rejection in favor
of what initially appeared to be untenable.4 Plato's philosophy, of
course, was defined largely by his vitriolic attacks on the relativist
implications of Sophistic teachings and by his reassertion of a stable,
accessible realm of rationality rising above the fluidity of Sophistical
argumentation.5 Plato's defense of the philosophy of truth against the
rhetoric of the probable runs through our intellectual heritage, with
philosophy maintaining the dominant position for much of this
2. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997).
3. See EDWARD SCHIAPPA, PROTAGORAS AND LOGOS: A STUDY IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY
AND RHETORIC 56, 170 (1991); see also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS:
A HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY FROM THE HOMERIC AGE TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
5-13 (1966); JOHN POULAKOS, SOPHISTICAL RHETORIC IN CLASSICAL GREECE 11-52 (1995).
4. See POULAKOS, supra note 3, at 187-93.
5. See id. at 74-112.
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history.6 Farber and Sherry appear on the scene of contemporary
legal theory to slay again, for the thousandth time, the Sophistic
serpent.
This well-rehearsed drama is not new to legal theory, of course.
Paul Carrington, former Dean at Duke University School of Law,
knows a thing or two about confronting a scholarly fixation with the
cool voice of traditionalism. In response to the growth of Critical
Legal Studies in the 1970s, Carrington penned a now-famous essay
that suggested that the crits should leave the legal academy if they
could not bring themselves to embrace and foster the profession of
lawyering.7 The response from critical quarters was quick and brutal:
Carrington was reduced to the Joe McCarthy of law teaching.' The
response from traditionalists consisted mainly of muffled applause
behind closed doors and a public reduction of Carrington's thesis to
the following tautology: "Those who don't believe in law shouldn't
teach it."9 Carrington seemed to miss the point that most Critical
Legal Studies scholarship, even if encumbered by page after page of
6. Vico's spirited but largely unheeded challenge to Descartes's rationalistic philosophy
represents one of the important points of confrontation in this long battle. For a description of
Vico's rebuttal of the Cartesian model as that model was gaining ascendency, see JOHN D.
SCHAEFFER, SENSUS COMMUNIS: VICO, RHETORIC, AND THE LIMITS OF RELATIVISM (1990).
7. See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984).
8. Ted Finman pointed out that
[slome of Carrington's critics have likened his proposal to the red baiting, loyalty oaths,
and McCarthyism of the 1950s. Many people will summarily reject this idea; others will
readily embrace it. Both positions contain elements of truth. On the one hand, the
comparison with the 1950s obscures crucial differences between the anti-communism of that
time and what Carrington calls for today; on the other, however, the uses to which his
thesis might be put all too closely resemble what went on during those unhappy years.
Ted Finman, Critical Legal Studies, Professionalism, and Academic Freedom: Exploring the
Tributaries of Carrington's River, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 180, 192 (1985) (citations omitted). Gunter
Frankenberg described Carrington's article as an "unfriendly warning from the thought police
[that] provoked an avalanche of liberal-minded protest from the Crits .... Carrington's polemic
conjured up visions of a McCarthyite turn, complete with political purges." Gunter Frankenberg,
Down by Law: Irony, Seriousness, and Reason, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 360, 367 (1989). See also
Jerry Frug, McCarthyism and Critical Legal Studies, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 665, 685-86,
694-95 (1987) (drawing parallels between the attacks by Carrington and others on proponents
of CLS to the McCarthy-era university purges). Needless to say, Carrington responded angrily
to these attacks and made his own counteraccusations. See Paul D. Carrington, Freedom and
Community in the Academy, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1577, 1583 n.11 (1988) (strenuously protesting
Frug's characterization and accusing Frug of practicing "the dark art of defamation in a manner
that would have made the Senator proud of Frug as a protdgd"). For an overview of the
reactions to Carrington's piece, see David A. Kaplan, A Scholarly War of Words over Academic
Freedom, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 11, 1985, at 1; and Peter W. Martin, "Of Law and the River," and of
Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985) (collected correspondence of
prominent figures in the debate).
9. For example, Louis Schwartz wrote that he "found Carrington's piece brilliant, civilized,
and insightful," but was careful to distance himself from Carrington's call for nihilists to leave
the legal academy. Letter from Louis B. Schwartz to Paul Brest, in Martin, supra note 8, at 19.
William Van Alstyne reduced Carrington's article to a tautology that begged the questions raised
by the dispute. See Letter of William W. Van Alstyne to the Committee on Academic Freedom
and Tenure of the American Association of University Professors, in id. at 20.
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contemporary continental social theory, sought to revive profes-
sionalism from the dogmatic slumbers of the day. The crits seemed to
miss the point that Carrington, even when wrapping himself in a
folksy Mark Twain persona, truly was concerned about the vital role
that lawyers play in both perpetuating and preventing injustice in
contemporary society. It seems that neither camp has yet overcome
this basic misunderstanding.
Farber and Sherry's response to radical multiculturalism places
them into Carrington's role in the context of contemporary debates,
but their book carries far more weight and undoubtedly will have a
much larger impact. First, Farber and Sherry have written an
accessible manuscript that will reach beyond the narrow cloister of
academics, but that nonetheless draws from a series of scholarly
articles written during the past several years.1" Additionally, neither
author can be dismissed as a political conservative who "just doesn't
get it." Moreover, unlike Mark Tushnet's generational attack on the
degradation of constitutional discourse at the hands of the new
Sophists,11 the book manages to maintain a respectable level of
civility and analytic remove. Farber and Sherry are content to
demonstrate that the radicals are wrong, and they do not share
Carrington's desire to see all nonbelievers leave the academy."
Finally, the zeitgeist appears to be moving in their direction: Nominal
liberals now appear embarrassed by the conundrums of affirmative
action policy and the increasingly fractionalized world of legal theory;
there is a palpable longing for the simpler days of the Great Society.
As a consequence of all these factors, Farber and Sherry's book is
certain to become a major point of reference in the next round of the
culture wars.
In this Book Review, I argue that yet another reenactment of the
Plato-Sophist battle is unproductive and even harmful to scholarly
discourse. Farber and Sherry are correct to insist that the Sophistic
fascination with deconstruction and variability cannot serve as a
guiding principle of a vibrant community (whether political or
scholarly), but they underestimate the degree to which their prescrip-
tion of "reason as truth" cannot be filled without committing an
equally debilitating mistake. What is needed is not another confron-
10. Coauthored articles on the topics pursued in their book are: Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?, 83 CAL. L. REV. 853 (1995); Daniel A.
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 807 (1993); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov:
Further Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN L. REV. 647 (1994) [hereinafter Farber
& Sherry, 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov].
11. See Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992);
Mark Tushnet, Reply, 81 GEO. L.J. 350 (1992).
12. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 8.
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tation of rhetoric with philosophy, but a willingness to abandon this
ingrained dichotomy by acknowledging that reason in law is not
exhausted by the concept of truth. What is needed is an effort to
reclaim reason in American legal scholarship by steering a course
between the dogmatic pursuit of truth and the self-indulgent pursuit
of provocation.
A topic of this breadth and of this degree of complexity must be
approached at several levels of abstraction if the discussion is to gain
purchase. Farber and Sherry have adroitly selected points of entry
that lead to a manageable discussion, and I am no less constrained in
my efforts to structure my assessment. I begin by recounting Farber
and Sherry's definition of the theoretical tenets of "radical multicul-
turalism," and then I demonstrate that their definition assumes away
the very issues that are in dispute. By making the subject of their
book that which is by definition unreasonable, they are able easily to
mount an argument against radical multiculturalism that appears to
be devastating. I first engage Farber and Sherry at the level of
definition because to a large extent their argument is all in the
naming.
In the next Part of the Book Review, I describe Farber and
Sherry's analysis of the perils of multiculturalism. Their conception of
perilous developments is inseparable from the preconceptions embed-
ded in their definition of radical multiculturalism. These undefended
commitments remain virtually invisible due to their ubiquity in
mainstream ways of thinking. Farber and Sherry's charge that radical
multiculturalism yields dangerous intellectual and political conse-
quences requires a tacit acceptance of Enlightenment ideology by the
reader. In the final Part of this Book Review, I provide a sketch of an
alternative conception of reason that accepts the force of the radical
critique of Enlightenment ideology without devolving into the
captiousness of crude, Sophistic provocation. I contend that reclaiming
reason in legal theory is a worthy project but that Farber and Sherry
fail in this task. In conclusion, I outline a rhetorical conception of
reason that reaches back to the Sophists and moves beyond the stale
and obfuscating oppositions that Farber and Sherry reinforce.
II. WHAT'S IN A NAME?
A. Farber and Sherry's Definition of Radical Multiculturalism
Farber and Sherry emphasize that they are targeting only radical
multiculturalist academics and do not offer a wholesale condemnation
of the various political goals associated with multiculturalism. The
manner in which they define the subject of their critique is essential
19981
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to their argument; therefore, their construction of radical multicul-
turalism merits close review. Farber and Sherry position themselves
within the broad pragmatist "mainstream" that stretches from Frank
Michelman to Richard Posner, 3 and characterize the radical mul-
ticulturalists as "extremists" who, no less than Robert Bork and his
fellow right-wing thinkers, demonstrate "an abandonment of
moderation and a dearth of common sense."' 4 In a quick and easy
intellectual genealogy, they trace the critique of inherited traditions
from Legal Realism, through Critical Legal Studies, to the current
radicals, but emphasize that the radicals have intensified the critique
by adding a preoccupation with issues relating to race and gender.15
Abandoning ordinary scholarly and political discourse and seeking to
overturn the very foundations of American legal thought,16 the
radical multiculturalists exhibit what, in the end, Farber and Sherry
believe can only be termed a "paranoid mode of thinking."17 This
cutting diagnosis is not drawn out of context. Farber and Sherry
acknowledge that their argument is barbed, but they insist that it is
"unavoidably harsh' 18 because the serious questions at hand demand
an uncompromising description and rejection of radical multicul-
turalism.1 9
Radical multiculturalism is an umbrella term used by Farber and
Sherry to reference extremists who espouse "voice" or "identity"
scholarship. Feminism, critical race theory, and gaylegal theory are
breeding grounds for radicals who argue that they have a unique,
counterhegemonic perspective, but who in fact all share the same
fundamentally flawed premises. In the broadest terms, the radicals are
engaged in a fierce and uncompromising battle against the Enlighten-
ment tradition.2' Consequently, mainstream scholars who do no more
than "cling to traditional Enlightenment aspirations" are now "at
some risk of being labeled racists and bigots."21 Whereas for Farber
and Sherry, the Enlightenment represents faith in the power of human
13. See id. at 131-33.
14. Id. at 3.
15. See id. at 21.
16. See id. at 16.
17. Id. at 133-37.
18. Id. at 13.
19. At various points in the book, Farber and Sherry are quite direct and colloquial in
expressing their disdain for the message propounded by the radicals. See, e.g., id. at 5
(characterizing the radicals as a "motley group"); id. at 9 (asserting that the radicals "have
relatively little interest in the nuances of philosophical theories"); id. at 101 (claiming that the
radicals are sloppy scholars unconcerned with factual accuracy); id. at 119 (finding that
"[b]esides being thoroughly unattractive in its implications, radical multiculturalism defies
common sense"); id. at 127 (describing the "implausibility" of the radicals' views); id. at 142
(alleging that the radicals exhibit a "paranoid style and rigidity").
20. See id. at 141.
21. Id. at 33.
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reason to rise above desire and prejudice, the radicals reject the belief
that power relations can be tamed with anything so pristine and
neutral.22 This radical anti-Enlightenment perspective is captured in
the rallying cry that all reality is "socially constructed,"23 a statement
that Farber and Sherry interpret to mean that there are no acontex-
tual truths to be apprehended by human reason, but instead only
historically contingent relationships of power and domination.
Farber, and Sherry relate several strands of radical multiculturalism
that flow from this fundamental notion that reality is socially
constructed. The radicals build on the traditions of Legal Realism and
Critical Legal Studies by insisting that legal doctrine is thoroughly
indeterminate and therefore can respond to contradictory and
changing social forces. This thesis, taken alone, is unexceptional, and
Farber and Sherry readily agree that the radicals are correct to attack
the remaining vestiges of legal formalism.24 Radical multiculturalists
push much farther, however, in arguing that legal doctrine is not just
indeterminate but a facilitator of "a deliberate concentration of power
in the white male establishment."'25 In their view, Farber and Sherry
contend, recognizing the indeterminacy of legal doctrine is merely the
first step in the broader project of rejecting the very presuppositions
of reasoned discourse. Radical multiculturalists deny the existence of
truths about which we can gain knowledge and reject the possibility
of developing neutral standards by which we can make objective
judgments of merit. Farber and Sherry concentrate their energies on
responding to this radical attack on truth and merit.
The radicals argue that the indeterminacy of legal doctrine is only
a particular manifestation of the absence of ahistorical and neutral
truth. Competing claims about law, politics, and society are not
descriptions that accord, more or less, with a true state of affairs that
exists independently of the descriptions. Instead, Farber and Sherry
state the radicals' argument as follows: There are only competing
narratives, none of which has any intrinsic superiority over the others.
If objective reality does not exist, as they suggest, then there is
no need to be concerned about truth.... If there are no solid
22. Farber and Sherry summarize this point nicely:
The Enlightenment's goal of an objective and reasoned basis for knowledge, merit, truth,
justice, and the like is an impossibility: "objectivity," in the sense of standards of judgment
that transcend individual perspectives, does not exist. Reason is just another code word for
the views of the privileged. The Enlightenment itself merely replaced one socially
constructed view of reality with another, mistaking power for knowledge. There is naught
but power.
Id. at 33.
23. See id. at 23-26.
24. See id. at 133.
25. Id. at 22.
1998]
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facts, then it makes no sense to ask whether any particular
narrative is true.26
Working from this premise, the radicals are dedicated to developing
new narratives that reverse the dominant discourse and its latent
support for power relationships structured to privilege whites and
males. They do not analyze racism with empirical methodologies
grounded in shared, scholarly presuppositions about the nature of
truth; rather, they attempt to change mindsets with emotionally
compelling stories, regardless of whether the stories are factually
accurate. 2' As a corollary, the radicals are dedicated to governmental
regulation of pornography, hate speech, and other (harmful)
constitutive narratives that lie behind the professed rationality of the
dominant worldview.
28
Farber and Sherry allege that the radicals slide from these starting
points to absurd conclusions. If political and scholarly discourse
amount to nothing more than battles of incommensurable stories
having no absolute truth value, the relativist conclusion that no story
is "better" than another follows quickly. Similarly, in their view, if
there are no "universal or common standards of judgment," because
there is no single narrative that can claim the status of truth, then the
concept of merit must be rejected as a cover for the exercise of
domination by one group over another.29 In particular, the radicals
move well beyond the idea that affirmative action should be taken to
ensure equal opportunity by adopting a thoroughgoing rejection of
the possibility of neutral criteria of merit and demanding that
"everything must be equally distributed., 30 Radicals are unwilling to
accept the assertion that criteria of merit may be the result of a
benign historical contingency, insisting instead that the criteria "are
constructed to solidify existing power relationships., 31 Consequently,
the radicals turn our understanding of merit on its head. Achieving
success is no longer the result of virtue and skill but an emblem of
participation in a hierarchical system of power and privilege. This
leads to Farber and Sherry's curious argument that radical multicul-
turalism ultimately is anti-Semitic.
3 2
26. Id. at 97.
27. Examples of stories that are deemed useful by the radicals, although not factually true,
include Tawana Brawley's fabricated rape charges, see id. at 96, and the charge that qualified
minorities are prejudiced in their efforts to obtain positions on law faculties, see id. at 129-31.
28. See id. at 40-47.
29. Id. at 26.
30. Id. at 52.
31. Id. at 60.
32. See id. at 52-71.
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In summary, Farber and Sherry define radical multiculturalism as
the embrace of anti-Enlightenment philosophical commitments by
those seeking to further the interests of various marginalized groups
(including racial minorities, women, and gays). The radicals do not
believe in truth or objective criteria of merit, but instead believe that
existing social structures and conventions are the result of an ongoing
power struggle in which dominant groups shape the terms of the
contest to ensure their continued victory. Appeals to truth and
objectivity are just moves in the domination game; oppressed groups
seduced by the Enlightenment promise of neutrality and objectivity
will only strengthen the chains that bind them. It should come as no
surprise that Farber and Sherry conclude by arguing that this wildly
improbable set of beliefs evidences a "paranoid mode of thought."33
B. It's All in the Naming
On the basis of Farber and Sherry's definition of radical multicul-
turalism, the case against the radicals seems too obvious to belabor.
And that is precisely the problem with their account. Farber and
Sherry employ the well-known rhetorical technique of defeating their
opponents by the manner in which they define their opponents'
position. In its cruder manifestations, this technique is characterized
as the defeat of a straw man. Because Farber and Sherry demonstrate
considerable skill, though, their strategy is better described as a feint
or misdirection. Before addressing their substantive arguments against
radical multiculturalism, it is critical to note the extent to which their
argument is accomplished simply by their characterization of radical
multiculturalism. It is unnecessary to engage in a line-by-line
assessment of their reporting abilities,'M for the principal problem is
the undefended conceptual presuppositions that drive their definition.
33. See id. at 133-37.
34. In some instances it is clear that they have been unfair to their targets, as when they
suggest that the radicals would assert that a book denying the Holocaust is as good as a book
that accurately reports the fact of the death camps. See id. at 120. In fact, in another chapter of
the book, they clearly acknowledge that radical multiculturalists would have no patience with
Holocaust deniers, but nevertheless saddle the multiculturalists with the sins of those persons
who would twist and abuse multiculturalist ideas. See id. at 109. Using this same rationale,
though, I easily could impugn their book on the basis of the simplistic and uninformed uses to
which it has already been put by commentators in the popular press who are interested in
generating sound bites rather than engaging in analysis. See, e.g., Heather Mac Donald, Book
Review, COMMENTARY, Oct. 1, 1997, at 64; Walter Olson, The Law on Trial, WALL ST. J., Oct.
14, 1997, at A20; Michael Skube, Law's Radicals Get Thrashing They Deserve, ATLANTA J. &
ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 16, 1997, at L12; see also Arnold Beichman, Beyond the Law, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 1997, at A19 (rehashing Mac Donald's review). The Holocaust example falls flat
anyway, since my perception (admittedly not based on actually reading any of this noxious
literature) is that Holocaust deniers are strict objectivists who claim that the real, undeniable
truth of history has been hidden by masterful storytellers pursuing political aims, thus making
them completely unsympathetic to radical multiculturalist philosophy.
1998]
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Farber and Sherry betray two central commitments in their
characterization of radical multiculturalism: They insist both that legal
practice is a pragmatic activity and also that it is objective in a way
that humanistic activities are not. At several crucial junctures, Farber
and Sherry emphasize that whatever appeal radical multiculturalism
may hold as a theoretical framework for studying art, literature, or
other humanistic endeavors, it holds no such appeal in analyzing the
legal system.35 Broadly characterized, Farber and Sherry's argument
is that multiculturalist scholars are radicals on the basis of their own
unwillingness to grant to law a place of cognitive privilege, secure
from the instability of the humanities. Adopting this perspective
without comment seems strange in light of the long history of the law
and literature movement, which has challenged the autonomy of law
in a variety of similar ways.36 This presumption is no small matter of
which the authors can assume acceptance by all of their readers, but
instead represents an important part of the radical program that is
taken seriously by a number of scholars today. Despite their repeated
claims to represent a broad-based, conciliatory pragmatism,37 Farber
and Sherry plainly take sides in the conflict they describe between
Enlightenment values and anti-Enlightenment critique. Scholars in the
arts and humanities may be willing to surrender to irrational
subjectivism, but Farber and Sherry insist that legal scholarship can
and should continue to be defined by empirical and rational strategies
designed to uncover the truth of the matter. It is not surprising that
they adopt this position-undoubtedly it is widely shared by most
members of the academy-but it is surprising that they do so without
offering any argument.
Farber and Sherry repeatedly decline to join in the philosophical
debate surrounding the critique of the Enlightenment," even as they
35. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 34, 119. Of course, the battle between rhetoric
and rationality is no less evident in the humanities, and the debate is not a replication of the
debate in legal theory: It is the same debate. Consequently, literary theory includes a standoff
between radical postmodernists, see, e.g., BARBARA HERNNSTEIN SMITH, BELIEF AND
RESISTANCE: DYNAMICS OF CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL CONTROVERSY (1997); BARBARA
HERNNSTEIN SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES FOR CRITICAL
THEORY (1988), neofoundationalist critical theorists, see, e.g., TERRY EAGLETON, IDEOLOGY,
AN INTRODUCTION (1991); TERRY EAGLETON, THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM (1996),
FREDRIC JAMESON, MARXISM AND FORM (1971); FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR,
THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991), and defenders of the canon of high
literature, see, e.g., HAROLD BLOOM, THE WESTERN CANON: THE BOOKS AND SCHOOL OF THE
AGES (1994). My thanks to Bruce Miller for emphasizing the importance of this point to my
critique.
36. Most recently, postmodern and deconstructive approaches have achieved some notoriety,
but these schools do not by any means exhaust the investigation of the juncture of law and
literature.
37. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 3, 27, 122, 131-33.
38. See id. at 7, 9, 96-99.
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describe this critique as the defining feature of the radical program.
Their several explanations for refusing to do so are unconvincing.
Admitting their limited abilities to engage the full philosophical depth
of the debate39 simply raises the question of why they took it upon
themselves to write the book and suggests more than a bit of
convenient humility. Without detailed argument, the claim that the
radicals are rather unsophisticated in their deployment of the
philosophical challenge to the Enlightenment4" appears dismissive
and, again, undercuts Farber and Sherry's stated purpose in writing
the book. Surely there is nothing new in the assertion that some legal
scholars have butchered an otherwise respectable and important
philosophical critique, and by no means do they limit their book to
such a circumspect theme.
Farber and Sherry's principal reason for avoiding the core of the
philosophical debate is more subtle, but proves equally unpersuasive.
They concede the philosophical critique of the Enlightenment for
purposes of argument, but then test this critical perspective by making
a pragmatic assessment of the "legal and societal implications of
radical multiculturalist legal theories., 41 In other words, Farber and
Sherry argue that radical multiculturalism leads to undesirable results
and should be rejected on pragmatic grounds even if the motivating
philosophical premises are granted.42 This strategy is curious, if not
bizarre, given their recurring theme that the radicals are to be faulted
primarily for abandoning the quest for truth in order to achieve
desirable political ends. Because the illegitimacy of this move by
Farber and Sherry is deeply connected with problems in their
argument, it warrants a more detailed discussion.
The first question raised by their approach is how to determine the
criteria for judging the pragmatic political effects of the radical
multiculturalist program. Farber and Sherry acknowledge that this
implicates a seemingly insuperable difficulty, but they proceed
nonetheless with an unearned air of confidence.
How, then, might one proceed in the face of such a deep
intellectual divide?
One possibility would be to debate the truth of the radical
multiculturalist ideas. The problem, of course, is that the two
sides espouse different theories of truth and commitments to
different forms of persuasion. It is the very concept of "truth"
that is in dispute.
39. See id. at 9.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 7.
42. See id. at 9-10.
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We have decided to take a different tack. Rather than asking
whether radical multiculturalism is good philosophical theory, we
prefer to ask whether it is wise politics.
If we shared no political values with the radical multicul-
turalists, this would be an equally pointless inquiry. But in fact
we believe that we do share some premises with them, or at least
with many of their sympathizers.
It should come as no surprise that the "shared premises" identified by
Farber and Sherry are the cornerstones of the Enlightenment tradition
of liberal political thought: equal treatment of all citizens, robust
public dialogue leading to increasingly deeper understanding, and
evolutionary improvements fostered by the development of accurate
historical understanding.' The entire book thus rests on the premise
that their opponents do not truly embrace radical multiculturalism all
the way down rather than on arguments against the merits of radical
multiculturalism. It is no overstatement to rephrase their line of attack
as follows: "We don't need to dispute the philosophy of radical
multiculturalism because we believe that enough adherents are
committed, at a deep level, to Enlightenment principles; working from
these shared principles as a starting point, we will demonstrate that
radical multiculturalism is undesirable under Enlightenment criteria."
In the end, Farber and Sherry do nothing more than define the
"broad consensus" 45 of true believers and then preach energetically
to the converted. What gets lost is an intellectual engagement with the
philosophical critique of the Enlightenment that the radicals bring
forward.
In defining radical multiculturalism using these polemical terms,
Farber and Sherry explicitly renew Plato's philosophical attack on
Sophistical rhetoric and thus reinvigorate the unhelpful dualism that
informs our traditional understanding of rationality. They caution us
that without "objective truth," there can be nothing other than
"authoritarian fiat, 46 and that without objective criteria of merit,
there is no rational basis for a critique of existing practices. 47 These
false alternatives are parasitic on the overarching dualism that Farber
and Sherry invoke at several points in their argument: the contest
between reason and rhetoric. Farber and Sherry in effect characterize
their opponents as a band of neo-Sophists who teach a dangerous and
43. Id. at 50.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 51.
46. Id. at 117.
47. See id. at 68.
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destabilizing kind of anarchical rhetoric, while they assume for
themselves the mantle of the defenders of reason and true knowledge.
The radicals thus try to explode the dominant myths or received
knowledge, disrupt the established order, shatter complacency,
and seduce the reader. The goal of scholarship is transformation;
knowledge is communicated with a flash of recognition that
resonates with the recipient's experience. (Most of these descrip-
tive terms come from their works.) The focus is on rhetoric
rather than logic; indeed, rhetoric, according to one radical
multiculturalist, is "a magical thing" that "transforms things into
their opposites" and makes "difficult choices become obvious."48
Farber and Sherry continue:
According to radical multiculturalists, language is used most
powerfully for subconscious or rhetorical effect; scholars in their
writing and government in its legislation should recognize and
respond to this primarily noncognitive aspect of language. For
defenders of the Enlightenment, on the other hand, language is
(or should be) primarily a tool for rational argument .... The
belief in the primacy of reason rather than rhetoric underlies
much of the resistance to both the message and the medium of
storytelling [as practiced by the radicals].
It is interesting to note the degree to which their accusations against
the radicals match descriptions of the Sophist program.5" Identifying
the radicals in this manner is not a prelude to argument, but serves as
the argument. Branded as an irresponsible group of what might be
characterized as the new Sophists, little more need be said to
persuade the reader of the bankruptcy of their thought.
48. Id. at 31 (quoting Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and
Black Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2 (1990)).
49. Id. at 48.
50. Compare Farber and Sherry's description of the radical view with a recent description
of the rhetorical philosophy propounded by the Sophists:
Sophistical rhetoric maintains that the world of discourse consists not of a singular, real
logos awaiting to be discovered and distinguished from its apparent counterpart, but of
dissoi logoi-human linguistic creations in unceasing contest with one another. This means
that any instance of rhetoric constitutes only one side of a two-sided issue, one utterance
without its counter-utterance. When confronted by a one-sided discourse, sophistical
rhetoric gives expression to an other, an unuttered side, in effect attempting to engage a
seemingly victorious discourse into yet another contest in which victory for the same side
is not guaranteed.
POULAKOS, supra note 3, at 188.
Inasmuch as counter-utterances and third alternatives are not already part of the familiar,
and therefore appropriate phraseology of the past, sophistical rhetoric labors to utter novel
words, fresh insights, and original thoughts. As such, it can be said to intervene in the
world of discourse tactically, with surprising utterances, the kind that do not add to but
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The most disturbing aspect of Farber and Sherry's characterization
of radical multiculturalism, however, is the heavy-handed manner in
which they equate radical philosophy with strident race- and gender-
conscious politics. Farber and Sherry grant the obvious-profoundly
important questions of race and gender in modern society call for new
approaches in our thinking and actions 5l-but ascribe the radical
multicultural message to the bizarre and paranoid outbursts of
minority scholars who are frustrated by the difficulty of overcoming
these problems in a rational and sensible manner. Radical multicul-
turalism, then, is an "ideology 5 2 that weaves the social construction
of reality, the critique of merit, and the debunking of the ideal of
truth into a powerfully seductive, self-reinforcing perspective, a
perspective that falsely promises to advance the fight for justice on
behalf of racial, gender, and sexual-orientation outsiders. This
ideology works first to explain away the incoherence of radical
versions of affirmative action53 and then to insulate the radicals from
attacks by critics who adhere to Enlightenment principles of
rationality.54 Farber and Sherry leave the reader with the feeling that
esoteric philosophical arguments by Foucault and others are
strategically borrowed in an unsophisticated way by radicals, resulting
in little more than an embarrassingly irrational stream of verbiage.
Farber and Sherry stand confident that Foucault's work should hold
no sway in law and that it is not well articulated by the radical
multiculturalist scavengers who are in search of rhetorical devices that
will justify their race-conscious political program.
There is no sound reason to address only the radical thinkers who
are expressly allied with radical race, gender, and sexual-orientation
politics. Farber and Sherry barely mention the work of Pierre Schlag,
an outspoken philosophical radical, presumably because he is a white
male who is not an advocate for particular radical political causes.
Schlag's work has strong affinities with the radical multiculturalists:
He adopts a theory of social construction with uncompromizing zeal
and rejects Enlightenment ideals of truth and objective merit.55
Schlag rejects any manner of normative legal theory, including critical
race theory and feminist theory, for normativity is part of the
ideological mindset that reaffirms the theorist as an autonomous and
self-directed observer. He reveals the interlocking web of routinized
51. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 9.
52. See id. at 118-27.
53. See id. at 126.
54. See id. at 127-29.
55. For an extended discussion of Schlag's articles and my critical rejoinder, see Francis J.
Mootz III, Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demonstration that the Obvious is Plausible, 61 TENN.
L. REv. 69, 104-08, 116-18 (1993).
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ideological behavior that creates the modern legal self of lawyers and
legal academics.56 Farber and Sherry do not discuss Schlag and other
philosophical radicals who do not fit into the prescripted story of
angry "minorities" running amok on the basis of questionable, second-
hand philosophy.
This same selective attention is evident in their description of
William Eskridge's work. As a leading scholar in gaylegal studies,
Eskridge is an obvious and necessary point of reference in their
discussion. In fact, it primarily was in a debate with Eskridge in the
pages of the Stanford Law Review that many of the themes in the
book were first developed and put to the test.5 Farber and Sherry,
however, discuss only Eskridge's gaylegal scholarship, which has been
prominently linked with his advocacy work on behalf of gays in the
military. They virtually ignore his extensive and careful philosophical
scholarship regarding the interpretation of statutes until the end of the
book, where they call for all radicals to move in similar productive
directions. They present this work as a positive example even though
Eskridge introduces and defends many of the philosophical claims
undergirding his gaylegal articles in these earlier works.58 It is clear
that Farber and Sherry ignore noted scholarship, scholarship that is
every bit as radical as the work they do discuss, when it is not
expressly allied with advocacy on behalf of political causes associated
with gays, women, and minorities.
In summary, Farber and Sherry nearly complete their argument in
defining the radical multiculturalist program. The radicals are anti-
Enlightenment thinkers who must be defined and judged according to
Farber and Sherry's Enlightenment criteria, since any deviation from
these foundational criteria must be regarded as irrational, un-
democratic, and oppressive. Moreover, they surreptitiously limit the
scope of radical anti-Enlightenment philosophy to those scholars
advocating for radical agendas on behalf of "outsiders," collapsing the
56. See Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi": The Politics of Form and the Domes-
tication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631, 1635-47, 1670-73 (1990).
57. See William Eskridge, Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994); Farber &
Sherry, 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov, supra note 10.
58. Farber and Sherry cite Eskridge's book on statutory interpretation as an example of "a
more constructive interaction with the tradition" that demonstrates the means by which only
"apparent" ruptures can in fact "revitalize a tradition and maintain its legitimacy." FARBER &
SHERRY, supra note 2, at 142 (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1994)). They may be highlighting the tempering effects that producing a legal
treatise has on an author more than noting a distinction between Eskridge's gaylegal scholarship
and his work on legislation. Notwithstanding his even-handedness in the treatise, his law review
scholarship illustrates that Eskridge is an unrepentant believer in the tenets of radical
multiculturalism as applied to statutory construction. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
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radical critique of Enlightenment rationalism into unbridled multicul-
turalism. The wider debate between the Sophistic challengers and the
Enlightenment defenders is concealed, represented as a confrontation
that need not be addressed seriously. Farber and Sherry correctly link
anti-Enlightenment philosophical commitments to these radical
political programs, but they deftly avoid analysis by ignoring the
philosophical premises and reconstructing the multicultural political
goals of the radicals in accordance with Enlightenment criteria. Not
surprisingly, the radicals fare poorly when their claims are analyzed
by Farber and Sherry; the critique has already been accomplished at
that point. By reviewing the details of their criticisms of radical
multiculturalism, however, I will underscore the manner in which they
have framed their analysis from the start, thereby pointing the way to
a more responsive, and therefore more responsible, assessment of
radical multiculturalism.
III. WHO'S AFRAID OF RADICAL MULTICULTURALISM?
A. Farber and Sherry's Analysis of the Perils of Radical Multicul-
turalism
Each of the central tenets of radical multiculturalism-the
deconstruction of truth, merit, and rationality-leads legal scholars to
conclusions and practices that Farber and Sherry insist are not just
wrongheaded but dangerous and destructive. Their assessment of the
perils of radical multiculturalism is so deeply connected to the biases
embedded in their definition of the radical position that their
discussion of the perils does not add much to their analysis. Rather
than considering the merits of their argument that significant
problems result from adopting a radical multicultural perspective, it
is more instructive to link their characterization of these problems to
their underlying preconceptions. For now, the point is not to take
issue with these preconceptions, but instead to identify them and to
emphasize that they remain wholly undefended.
The most obvious peril of radical multiculturalism identified by
Farber and Sherry flows from the thesis that objective truth is a myth
and that there is nothing outside of stories and narratives constructed
by those who dominate social life. Starting with Patricia Williams's
assessment that the Tawana Brawley case evidenced a terrible crime
even if Ms. Brawley's account of being raped was not factually
correct, Farber and Sherry argue that scholarship becomes nothing
more than politics, and politics nothing more than the exercise of
power, when truth is subordinated to the construction of stories that
reinforce the radical ideology. Radicals police the stories being told
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with an eye toward political effectiveness and disregard the effects
that these stories have on real people living in the real world.
The radical multiculturalist dismissal of the possibility of
objective truth is fraught with peril. With no possibility of appeal
to a standard of truth independent of politics, there is no way to
mediate among truth claims except by recourse to authoritarian
fiat. This resort to power risks silencing not only dissenters from
the radical multiculturalist party line, it also hurts innocent
bystanders, such as the men Tawana Brawley falsely accused.59
This failing is not limited to "he said/she said" accounts of discrete
events; it also infects the resolution of matters of social policy. Farber
and Sherry argue that political advocacy leads radicals to ignore the
fact that single parent households are less desirable for children,6" to
disregard the fact that there is no empirical evidence that racial
minorities are disadvantaged by the current hiring practices of law
faculties,6 and also to ignore the real situation of working women in
the quest to maintain the feminist party line.62
The nonchalant attitude of radicals toward factual accuracy is
simply a particular manifestation of a broader attack on the notion of
historical truth. Farber and Sherry do not claim that establishing an
historical fact is unproblematic, inasmuch as they accept a distinction
between events and their subsequent interpretation, but they do
emphasize that some interpretations of factual events are simply
untrue.63 It remains ambiguous whether they believe that there are
a number of interpretations that have varying truth values in evolving
contexts, or whether there is a single truthful interpretation that is
difficult to capture once and for all in light of human limitations. "The
past should not be viewed as infinitely malleable. Whether or not we
can ever actually achieve objective truth, some stories come closer
than others. ' Either way, they demarcate a line between the reality
of historical events and the moderately destabilizing indeterminacy of
interpretation within particular social contexts.
The peril presented by losing objective history, of moving forward
without a firm factual foundation supporting social life, is that social
constructionism becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. When radicals
achieve a degree of power, even if only in the limited sphere of an
59. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 117.
60. See id. at 101.
61. See id. at 76-77.
62. See id. at 104-05.
63. See id. at 108-11. They discuss the work of Hayden White in connection with this line
of analysis. See, e.g., HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIvE DISCOURSE
AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION (1987).
64. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 111.
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academic field, they begin to construct a pseudo-reality with
frightening implications for those within the field. Evoking images of
the Stalinist horror in which ideology ruled and facts were produced
by the state to further ideological ends, Farber and Sherry describe
the brutal professional retaliation against a female historian who
testified as an expert on behalf of a corporation fighting a Title VII
claim. She argued that women are culturally conditioned to be less
likely to seek certain kinds of employment.65 The subsequent attacks
by radical feminists allegedly were not motivated by inadequacies in
the historian's methodology but by the political implications of her
research. The true situation of working women is secondary to the
radicals, Farber and Sherry argue, because the radicals aim only to
construct an empowering feminist narrative that they then defend
viciously without regard to its empirical truth.
Farber and Sherry argue that the critique of merit that flows from
the rejection of truth and historical objectivity similarly has unaccep-
table results. If judgments of merit are not grounded in objectivity,
but are rather implementations of social power by advantaged
members of society, radical multiculturalist ideology necessarily must
regard successful persons as oppressors. This perspective leads
inevitably to anti-Semitism, they contend, since Jews are dispropor-
tionately meritorious according to current standards and therefore will
be regarded as a group particularly aligned with the forces of social
oppression. Initially, this seems plausible insofar as any attack on
those achieving success will fall disproportionately on different groups.
Farber and Sherry, however, do not argue simply that radical
multiculturalism will prove to be bad for the Jews, but also contend
that it is anti-Semitic. This allegation requires detailed analysis.
Jews historically are linked with Enlightenment values and the
triumph of universalized rationalism over parochial prejudices in
public life; Farber and Sherry thus assert that there is a natural
convergence of anti-Enlightenment thinking and anti-Semitism.'
More importantly, characterizing standards of merit as socially
constructed and "merely the exercise of group power" inevitably leads
to the conclusion that disproportionate "Jewish success" is "the fruit
of Jewish power" in contemporary society.67 Farber and Sherry claim
that the radicals reject an alternative reading of Foucault-a reading
arguing that power practices operate at a level deeper than the
conscious machinations of powerful interests68 -which would permit
65. See id. at 104-05; see also infra note 105.
66. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 71.
67. Id. at 56.
68. See id. at 67.
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them to explain the success of Jews and Asians as the result of a
meshing of their cultural values of education and entrepreneurship
with the needs of modern society.69 In contrast, describing power
practices as the fruit of group conspiracies leaves the radicals with
only three possible explanations of Jewish and Asian success, all of
which are irremediably discriminatory. Jews and Asians are
surprisingly successful because they are the hidden conspirators in
defining standards of merit (the grossest form of anti-Semitism and
anti-Asian ideology); because they successfully mimic Caucasian
oppressors like parasitic lackeys; or because they are permitted to
succeed by Caucasian oppressors interested in promoting the ideology
of egalitarianism by creating a symbol of minority achievement. All
of these explanations evidence racist beliefs that undermine the public
space of neutrality and achievement-hallmarks of the Enlightenment
era. Farber and Sherry conclude that "to the extent that the radicals
reject the traditions of the Enlightenment, they invite the recurrence
of pre-Enlightenment evils" like rabid anti-Semitism."
Farber and Sherry allege that the corrosive effects of radical
multiculturalism extend beyond the creation of scapegoats. Ultimately,
radical multiculturalism undermines the ability of radicals to promote
their agendas because it destroys the public forum of scholarly
discourse. When rational arguments are replaced by stories that
primarily hold emotional appeal, scholarship is replaced by a "warped
discourse" in which knowledge is "personalized rather than objec-
tive."71 Storytelling works to insulate radical scholars from criticism
by mainstream scholars who do not share their presumed distinctive
voice," creating a self-referential body of scholarship that is neither
challenged nor tested and so ultimately devolves into absurdity.73
Radical multiculturalism distorts public discourse and makes academic
power politics, rather than reasoned debate, the only means for
advancing its cause against the protests of Enlightenment scholars.
Even within the sealed world of radical scholarship, the disregard
for truth works to undermine the possibility of discourse by prevent-
ing even minority scholars from engaging in debate with the radicals.
Farber and Sherry describe several famous public bloodlettings and
69. See id. at 53-54.
70. Id. at 53; see also Peter Margulies, Inclusive and Exclusive Virtues: Approaches to
Identity, Merit, and Responsibility in Recent Legal Thought, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 1109, 1127
(1997) (explaining that Farber and Sherry believe that the problem with replacing the Enlighten-
ment commitment to "reason and cognition" with appeals to "rhetoric and emotion" is that "the
monsters of our unreasoning imagination-anti-Semitism, Holocaust revisionism, and religious
fanaticism-will take center stage").
71. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 73.
72. See id. at 87-88.
73. See id. at 72-73.
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conclude that "to disagree with radical multiculturalists is not merely
to be incorrect but to be a traitor or apostate."74 "This violent
rejection of dissenters is obviously not conducive to open inquiry and
discussion of highly charged issues."75 Moreover, discussions among
the radicals often devolve into absurd parodies, since storytelling is
such an indeterminate means of presenting an argument that an
inordinate amount of energy is spent supporting their readings of
prior radical work. "The point of these stories remains obscure in part
because of the paucity of explicit reasoning connecting them to a clear
conclusion.... [T]he story merely lies on the table, offering an
aesthetic experience like a coffee table ornament, but fails to move
the discussion forward."76 When there is a conflict over the meaning
or merit of a story, rational discourse is replaced by ad hominem
attacks on the storyteller and the competing critics, resulting in a
"postmodern fiasco."77
The ideology of radical multiculturalism thus produces an academic
world unmoored from truth and history. Power politics is the name of
the game; merit and truth are just tools of oppression used by those
currently wielding the upper hand. The ugly, even if largely
unexpressed, byproduct of this ideology is racism, racism directed
against distinct and small minorities who succeed disproportionately
in what is now viewed as a battle of group interests. The more
noticeable effect of this ideology is the complete unraveling of public
discourse about these issues. Over time, radical multiculturalism
becomes more hermetic and is marked by an increasingly vicious fight
to define the political agenda on behalf of minority scholars.
Ultimately, radical multiculturalism must collapse as a consequence
of its own absurdities or-and this seems to be the deep fear that
motivates Farber and Sherry-it must so infect wider scholarly
discourse that the scholarly enterprise itself is imperiled.
B. Beyond Fear and Loathing in Scholarly Discourse
Farber and Sherry issue an indictment that is well presented in its
theme and particulars, and that merits a serious assessment. It is
important to recognize, though, that their rhetorical success is
purchased by assuming precisely what is in question. Farber and
Sherry depend on their reader's strong identification with their own
74. Id. at 80.
75. Id. at 81. Farber and Sherry describe the controversies arising out of the attempts by
Randall Kennedy, a black professor at Harvard Law School, and Jim Chen, an Asian professor
at the University of Minnesota Law School, to raise questions about the merits of radical
multiculturalism. See id. at 80-81.
76. Id. at 86.
77. Id. at 93.
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definition of the Enlightenment values at stake in the debate, first by
defining the radicals as those who oppose such values, and then by
describing the danger of radical multiculturalism as the abandonment
of these same values. It is as if the conversation stops if Enlighten-
ment values are questioned: You are either for or against, and the
analysis unfolds for either side once a commitment is made. Without
this prior commitment in place, their book simply does not exert any
persuasive force. For this reason, their book amounts to an elaborate
form of whistling in what they perceive to be a postmodern darkness.
It is possible that Farber and Sherry see no need to defend the
Enlightenment view that is under attack by the radicals because they
construe the recourse to obscure French philosophy as an implausible
instrumental move to achieve certain (irrational) political goals.
However, the critique of Enlightenment ideology raises very real and
challenging questions that should be addressed.78 The concepts of
historical truth and objectivity are far more complex than they
appreciate, as evidenced by a growing body of philosophical work that
concludes that radical challenges to standard conceptions of historical
truth must be addressed. For example, Joseph Margolis recently
presented a sustained argument that several contemporary
philosophical currents (controversial in themselves) are moving
haltingly toward a radically historicist conception of truth, reason, and
science. Margolis contends that the central problem for contemporary
philosophers is the resolution of the relationship between flux and
invariance in human experience. This problem emerges from the
"Enlightenment vision" of history as a flux of unique events that are
assessed by human reason, which itself exists outside this flux as an
invariant dimension of reality.79 Margolis demonstrates that a radical
critique of this Enlightenment perspective can be both coherent and
persuasive. He begins by arguing that the "nature" of persons as
reasoning beings is a "direct function of a social, narratized memory
of how they themselves have been identified and could be re-
identified,"8 with the result that "coherence-the rules of reason
and the laws of the world-is itself historically constructed, an artifact
of the dawning possibilities our horizoned experience happens to
78. Although they do not describe what they mean by claiming a "pragmatist" perspective,
robust pragmatic accounts generally involve a critique of the strongest claims of the
Enlightenment period, even when they remain committed to empirical analysis conducted by a
community of individual observers. Consequently, their philosophical disposition probably is
allied, if weakly, to some features of the critique that motivates radical multiculturalism. A
nuanced discussion of such issues is foreclosed by Farber and Sherry's argument that the critique
of Enlightenment ideology by the radicals paves the way for unreasoning and emotional scholar-
ship that imperils fundamental features of social life.
79. See JOSEPH MARGOLIS, THE FLUX OF HISTORY AND THE FLUX OF SCIENCE 15 (1993).
80. Id. at 139.
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disclose."81 Margolis does not regard this insight as particularly
unsettling to humanistic inquiry, since "objective" natural sciences
similarly emerge from the historical and horizoned flux of human
existence."
From this recognition, Margolis derives the insight of radical
historicism: History (along with all other human undertakings) does
not refer to fixed data that can be recounted in a "true" manner for
all time (irony exists when we view history as timeless).8 Part of his
thesis appears surprising initially but follows nonetheless: History is
not fixed and unchangeable in the way that a discrete physical event
in the past is unchangeable.8 Rather than "a narrative construction
81. Id. at 205.
82. Margolis summarizes:
[We sense in everyday life that] though we "make" the world, we cannot make it any way
we please. We open our eyes and see a world we cannot ignore: still, what we see is due
to what we are; and what we are we are is a result of our continuous self-formation and
transformation within a larger history and the larger processes of nature. So the
"resistance" of the encountered world is not at all incompatible with its being
"constituted." On the contrary, a temperate realism now requires such a compatibility. Put
in the simplest terms: the apparent invariances of physical phenomena are just such in-
variances noted under the changing, formative conditions of human history. We posit them,
from within that history, as realities independent of that history....
. If this holds for physical nature, it cannot fail to be even more compelling when
applied to cultural phenomena.
JOSEPH MARGOLIS, INTERPRETATION RADICAL BUT NOT UNRULY: THE NEW PUZZLE OF THE
ARTS AND HISTORY 91-92 (1995).
83. Margolis defines radical historicism in a refined exposition that matches what Farber and
Sherry criticize as the thesis of social construction.
By radical history, I mean at least: first, that we have no reason to think the real world is
invariantly structured in any fixedly essential or necessary way; second, that, if that is so,
knowledge and inquiry never discern an invariant order or an order not already dependent
on the contingent symbiosis of knower and known; third, that knower and known are them-
selves historically preformed in a tacit and blindly perspectived way; fourth, that reference
and predication are effective in practice despite our lacking any principled criteria for fixing
the unique identity of this and that and despite our lacking changeless universals in virtue
of which (alone) particular ascriptions and interpretations are rendered intelligible and true;
fifth, that the referents of discourse need not possess, or have assigned to them, fixed
natures, but may change (in) the "natures" or histories or "historied natures" they are
assigned, without disabling reference or reidentification; and sixth, that, as a consequence,
even the physical sciences, even logic and mathematics, are, as far as their lawlike and
formal invariances are concerned, similarly bound by the conditions mentioned.
Id. at 112-13.
84. Developing the fifth element in the definition quoted in the preceding footnote, Margolis
argues that history is not bound by an invariant "event of history" lodged in the past:
Is it always true that a change in judgment or interpretation about the past does not alter
the past? Could it possibly be true that sometimes, an interpretation of the past alters the
past without reversing time, without undoing the physical past? The surprising answer is: (1)
it is at least a coherent view; and (2) it may also be a reasonable view.
MARGOLIS, supra note 79, at 157.
Margolis contends that "the historical past entails the physical past, but is not reducible to it,"
and so "history (and the historical past) need not be "finished" or "closed"-in the sense in
which the physical past is closed (or is past or has passed or is gone or is no more)." Id. at 158.
This thesis is controversial to say the least, but Margolis argues persuasively that the radical
interpretation of current philosophical themes provides a more coherent and satisfying account
than the typically cautious expressions by leading opponents of Enlightenment ideology.
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extrinsically imposed on the passage of time," the historical past is a
feature of our presently lived experience and therefore is not
"closed., 8 5 It is unnecessary for present purposes to defend Mar-
golis's claim in detail; it is important to note only that he weaves his
radical argument from many of the philosophical resources of our day:
not merely Foucault, Derrida, and Gadamer, but Putnam, Habermas,
Kuhn, and Quine as well. Farber and Sherry simply cannot wish away
the challenge posed by radical conceptions of history and historical
truth by making minimal concessions to Hayden White's confused
bifurcation of reality and historical narrative.86  Margolis
demonstrates quite persuasively, if paradoxically, that our ability to
distinguish history and fiction rests on our willingness to confront
radical historicism openly.87 In the final Part of this Book Review,
I shall offer a positive account of reason that is congenial to Margo-
lis's claims and the philosophical critiques voiced by the radicals.
It will not do to allege that the radicals reject familiar conceptions
of historical truth and objectivity and to consider the matter closed.
Farber and Sherry need to confront the contemporary critique of
Enlightenment ideology in which reason is thoroughly historical and
history is narratively constructed. 8 Farber and Sherry do not
describe a single instance of a radical thinker doubting the laws of
physics or disbelieving the reality of the gas chambers; indeed, they
could not hope to find such unpersuasive claims in the scholarship
that they survey. But neither do they engage the more challenging
thesis, advanced in varying degrees by many philosophers over the
past century, that history is a social activity rather than a fixed object
of study. The gas chambers existed as physical objects and the victims
of Nazi terror surely died there, but the historical reality of the
Holocaust is subject to change because it is not and has never been
invariant. Creating a powerful story about the Holocaust is not a
strategy that supplements the writing of history, because history is a
presently lived narrative, all the way down. The important point is
that this acknowledgment, despite its radical character, does not in
principle disable us from arguing with justification that some stories
are better than others and that some stories are positively vile.
85. Id. at 159.
86. Margolis attacks the "muddle" left by White's halting concessions to radical historicism
for undermining the notion that human events in the past or present are real, thus creating more
problems than a radical confrontation with the historicity of understanding would pose. Id. at
188-93.
87. See Margolis, supra note 82, at 201-32.
88. This is meant to claim much more than the commonplace view of invariant history being
subjected to interpretive narratives that are shaped by contextual factors. History under the
radical view is not a topic of study but a mode of being.
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Consider the weakness of Farber and Sherry's criticism of William
Eskridge's history of the Perry Watkins case against the Army.89
Eskridge recounts the Watkins case in its official, juridical guise, but
then explodes the myth of this story by detailing how Watkins was
both an extremely effective sailor and an openly, even flamboyant,
gay man who represented a fundamental challenge to traditional
gender roles.9" Farber and Sherry do not impeach the accuracy of the
events described by Eskridge, but they contend that Watkins
presented an atypical profile of a gay man in the military. They
question whether Eskridge is attempting to (re)define the "archetypal
gay experience" by mistakenly claiming that Watkins represents "a
prevalent phenomenon.' 91 By reading Eskridge through their
"historical objectivity" lens, though, they have profoundly misread his
article. Eskridge does not assert that Watkins's experiences in the
military represent a prevalent phenomenon but that the experience of
strongly heterosexual men seeking sex from gay men during periods
of isolation and stress itself represents a prevalent phenomenon
known as situational homosexuality.' In fact, Eskridge demonstrates
that Watkins's quite fantastic story of being an openly gay man
permitted to reenlist during the Vietnam War but run out of the
military during the 1980s purge of homosexuals is wholly suppressed
in the process of creating a case history on appeal. Farber and Sherry
do not appreciate that the ideal of typicality can be a means of
deceptively and selectively packaging real life as historical truth.
Moreover, they are blind to Eskridge's demonstration that the legal
construction of history in the form of factual findings is a fitting
metaphor for, if not an object lesson of, the social construction of
history and culture writ large.
Farber and Sherry demonstrate the same misunderstanding when
they criticize Patricia Williams for insisting that Tawana Brawley was
the victim of "some unspeakable crime" notwithstanding the
conclusion of legal authorities that she fabricated her story about
being gang-raped.93 Regarding the truthfulness of Brawley's account
as irrelevant to the project of cultivating race victimhood insults the
victims of sexual abuse and undermines the integrity of scholarship,
they contend. But this reading is perverse, in that it conflates
Williams's views with those of Al Sharpton. Williams never advocates
89. See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated, 875 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
90. See Eskridge, supra note 57, at 611-12 (the "conservative pragmatist" account); id. at
621-22 (the "prophetic pragmatist" account that can be utilized by social constructionists).
91. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 79.
92. See Eskridge, supra note 57, at 627 n.100.
93. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 96.
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ignoring the falsity of Brawley's account, but instead attempts to get
at the truth behind the lie by inquiring into the bizarre circumstances
surrounding a fifteen-year-old girl's fictionalized expression of some
untold (and potentially untellable) violence. In recent commentary on
the civil defamation suit against Brawley and her advisors, Williams
cogently explains that the issue is what "truth" the law is willing to
hear and is capable of confronting.94 There is no philosophical
relativism in this account, although plainly there is a philosophical
pluralism implied in the radical critique of the socially constructed
range of questions that we pose in response to events. Williams
problematizes rather than disputes the truth, arguing that there are
multiple truth-seeking questions and that canonized thinking can skew
truth even if it does not provide false answers.
Granting the plausibility, if not the persuasiveness, of the social
constructionist critique of the Enlightenment views of history and
truth would appear to reinforce the concerns about anti-Semitism
voiced by Farber and Sherry. If there will in fact be a tendency to
paint Jews and Asians as social manipulators once the objectivity of
the criteria of merit are undermined, there is a sufficient starting point
for their argument. Inflammatory allegations of anti-Semitism are
simply unwarranted as a generic critique of the radicals, however,
even if it is prudent always to remain on the watch for specific
incidents of anti-Semitism, whether express or latent.95 On its own
94. See Patricia Williams, Through a Glass Darkly, NATION, Jan. 12, 1998, at 10. Her original
discussion of the Brawley case that Farber and Sherry criticize is no less reasonable. Williams
skillfully highlights the racism and sexism displayed by the various "players" in the Brawley
affair and the apparent lack of concern about what in fact had happened, even if Brawley had
done everything to herself. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS
168-78 (1991). This is highlighted by Williams's comparison of the reaction to Brawley and the
reaction to Charles Stuart, a white man who killed his pregnant wife and then falsely alleged
that a black man had committed the crime. See id. at 242 n.5.
95. Farber and Sherry clearly assert that radical multiculturalism as a philosophical position
leads to anti-Semitism, not just that some radical multiculturalists have anti-Semitic sentiments.
Not only do they fail to demonstrate that this is the case, however, despite devoting an entire
chapter to the topic of anti-Semitism; they also do not provide even one convincing example.
They do contend that Derrick Bell's attack on, the concept of merit has "anti-Semitic
implications" because, after conceding the disproportionate success of Jews in securing posts on
the Harvard faculty, he argues that this example of minority success does not change the fact
that rigid adherence to criteria of merit is no less an illegitimate tool of exclusion than prior anti-
Jewish quotas. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 58 n.10. This example of alleged anti-
Semitism is wholly unconvincing on its face and falls flat in their book even if one disagrees with
Bell that the ideology of meritocracy is "no less illegitimate" than consciously discriminating
against Jews. Elsewhere, they criticize Bell's depiction of Jews in his story The Space Traders,
see id. at 4, and also his contextualist defense of Louis Farrakhan's anti-Semitism as an
understandable expression of black rage, see id at 44. As to the first instance, Bell has employed
his controversial and provocative "interest convergence" thesis to question the altruism of
groups other than Jews, and so it does not appear to be inherently anti-Semitic except in the
very attenuated sense that Jews will be disproportionately targeted to the extent that their social
power is disproportionate. Moreover, the story describes Jews acting for the good in accordance
with their self-interest (unlike the very unfavorable depiction of Christian groups by Bell) until
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terms, their case for the anti-Semitic nature of radical multiculturalism
is hopelessly confused. Their analysis depends upon a conspiratorial
theory of socially constructed criteria of merit, but they never
effectively demonstrate that the radicals intend to adopt such a crude,
modernist model of social constructionism. In fact, elsewhere in the
book, Farber and Sherry attribute the embrace of emotional storytell-
ing (which they sharply distinguish from rational analysis) and the
demand for interventionist activities by the government to the claim
by radicals that racism and sexism are precognitively structural and
unconsciously embedded.9 6 To make their anti-Semitism charge stick,
Farber and Sherry suppose that power structures must either be
conscious creations of those wielding power or entirely arbitrary
accidents of history, and they then link the radicals to the former
conception. It is clear, however, that the most persuasive analyses of
power practices are somewhere in the middle of this range.97 Much
more is required of Farber and Sherry to support their "conscious
conspiracy" reading of radical multiculturalism.
Moreover, Farber and Sherry describe merit in very conventional
terms, tracking the economic success of various groups as a measure
of the merit demonstrated by members of these groups. But this
narrow (even by American standards) measure of success does not tell
the full story. Writing about the stunning economic success of Korean
immigrants in New York City, a commentator recently noted the
obvious: Envisioning a Korean candidate for mayor amounts to "sheer
they are brutally suppressed by the majority-hardly the traditional mode of anti-Semitic
proselytizing. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE
OF RACISM 186-87 (1992). As to Bell's assessment of Farrakhan, Farber and Sherry properly
raise questions about Bell's judgment, although they fall well short of demonstrating that his
commitment to radical multiculturalist philosophy breeds anti-Semitism. See FARBER & SHERRY,
supra note 2, at 4. In fact, Bell's dialogue about Farrakhan suffers from another "failing"
attributed by Farber and Sherry to radical multicultural scholarship: it is equivocal and unsettling
rather than categorical and partisan. Ironically, Bell is not really discussing Farrakhan at all but
is instead noting the insistent demand by the white majority that prominent blacks speak out
against Farrakhan in order to maintain their "standing." See BELL, supra, at 118-25.
96. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 45-47. Ironically, by claiming that anti-Semitism
naturally follows from the philosophy of radical multiculturalism despite the professed
commitments against anti-Semitic policies by the radicals, Farber and Sherry appear to be
embracing the presuppositions that lead some radicals to urge regulation of hate speech. It is
as if they believe that the seductive power of radical multicultural arguments overcome reason
and drive those who adhere to these arguments to intolerant beliefs that threaten the fabric of
society. See Margulies, supra note 70, at 1150.
97. For an excellent synthesis of Foucault's analysis of symbolic structures and systems of
power relations and Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy in a manner that provides strong
support (as yet unnoticed by legal scholars, as far as I can determine) for the work of many
radical multiculturalists seeking to establish the power of preconceptions without abandoning
the power of critique, see HANS HERBERT KOGLER, THE POWER OF DIALOGUE: CRITICAL
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fantasy."98 Despite general Asian-American economic success, it
should come as no surprise that there is a lively and growing body of
critical race scholarship by Asian-American theorists concerned about
hegemonic power practices and the insidiously misleading construction
of Asians as the model minority.9  Farber and Sherry translate the
argument over merit and achievement solely into economic terms,
whereas most critical race theorists and feminists would regard
differential economic success as being only a general and imperfect
symptom of a society that is structured in significant ways by racial
and gender ideology. For example, Gabriel J. Chin has suggested that
Asian Americans may not have faced the same debilitating Jim Crow
obstacles confronting African Americans because racist immigration
policies and laws had successfully kept the Asian population in this
country extremely small and relatively unthreatening."°
Finally, the meaning of disproportionate Jewish and Asian success
is no less problematic for Farber and Sherry than it is for the radicals.
Do Farber and Sherry mean to claim that Jews and Asians are more
meritorious than members of other groups, even if they would claim
that this imbalance is the result of arbitrary historical events favoring
certain traits over others? Farber and Sherry remain quite willing to
reconsider specific elements of the meritocracy in place and to
monitor vigilantly whether the criteria are being applied evenly, but
the broad contours of our conceptions of merit are placed beyond
discussion by the assumption that merit exists but is attacked by
disgruntled group members who don't measure up to the standards.
Yet Farber and Sherry's very description of Jewish success betrays
what they refuse to acknowledge: that socially defined conceptions of
merit are deeply intertwined with ongoing political, economic, and
class struggles. Farber and Sherry report that Jews, regarded in terms
of an historically conditioned group identity, are aligned with the
values of the Enlightenment because those values provide an
98. Jeffrey Goldberg, The Overachievers, N.Y., Apr. 10, 1995, at 43, 46.
99. See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race
Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241 (1995); Pat K. Chew,
Asian Americans: The "Reticent" Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1
(1994). The fact that Asian Americans are not given any preferential treatment under many
affirmative action policies, see, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, Statistical Analysis of Asian Americans and
the Affirmative Action Hiring of Law School Faculty, 3 ASIAN L.J. 39 (1996), despite pervasive
racism against them, raises a number of problematic issues that are not resolved by adopting the
simple view of Asians as the "model minority" that have overcome all effects of racism, see Pat
K. Chew, Asian Americans in the Legal Academy: An Empirical and Narrative Profile, 3 ASIAN
L.J. 8 (1996); Harvey Gee, Changing Landscapes: The Need for Asian Americans to Be Included
in the Affirmative Action Debate, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 621 (1997); Frank Wu, Neither Black nor
White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225 (1995).
100. See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 1998).
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explanatory cover for their success and fend off anti-Semitic attacks
on any accumulation of power and/or wealth. 0 1 Because Farber and
Sherry accept the premise that Jews have aligned themselves with a
cultural model that favors their precarious position within a
prejudiced society,1 2 they contend that Gary Peller's claim that
Mark Tushnet recoils on account of his American Jewish perspective
is, in some important respect, "insightful.' 1 3 Unless one is ready to
accept a definition of "neutral and objective" as that which permits
the Jews to flourish, Farber and Sherry raise more questions about
the "naturalness" of criteria of merit than they answer.1°4
The final peril of radical multiculturalism-the degradation of
scholarly discourse-hardly seems important in comparison to aban-
doning truth or embracing anti-Semitic ideology, but Farber and
Sherry make their strongest point in connection with this claim. There
is no basis to believe that academic battles between radicals are any
less civilized than between other academics, for ad hominem
bloodbaths and struggles to define orthodoxy are more or less par for
the course-consider the intellectual history of Freudian psychology,
Marxist political economy, or quantum mechanics. Because a stagnant
intellectual tradition is most conducive to civility and incremental
scholarship, the bulk of the fireworks that Farber and Sherry identify
might be attributed to the fact that the radicals are seeking to disrupt
current thinking rather than to the substance of the radicals' alter-
native vision. Although Farber and Sherry may have overstated the
connection between radical multiculturalism and the breakdown of
scholarly discourse, their assessment that the radicals seem
philosophically disposed to unproductive scholarly exchanges rings
somewhat true in light of notorious confrontations between
scholars. 5 On close inspection, however, it becomes clear that the
101. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 71.
102. See id. at 92.
103. Farber and Sherry report Peller's claim that Jews have maintained a beneficial
"compromise" with the Christian majority in order to preserve a private cultural sphere of
Jewish belief and a safe public sphere of Jewish success. Id.
104. See id. Richard Posner feels compelled to interrupt his journalistic cheerleading in a
recent review of the book to note the incongruity between Farber and Sherry's attack on identity
politics and the manner with which they address Jewish identity and the alleged anti-Semitism
of radical scholars. See Richard Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40,
42 (arguing that Farber and Sherry do not uncover true anti-Semitism and suggesting that they
too may be infected by the "postmodern virus" that they are criticizing).
105. Farber and Sherry refer to the years of bickering that followed the expert testimony
by feminist historian Rosalind Rosenberg on behalf of a defendant in a major gender
discrimination lawsuit. Rosenberg testified that women are culturally conditioned not to seek
certain types of high-paying sales positions. Because the government argued its case on the basis
of statistics, Rosenberg's testimony was an important factor in the defendant's victory.
Rosenberg was later attacked for undermining the cause of gender equality.
As always, however, there are two sides to the story. Farber and Sherry describe a vicious
campaign against Rosenberg by ideological feminists upset at her unwillingness to ignore the
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radicals evidence these traits because their philosophical commitments
are not radical enough.
The central problem for scholarly discourse under a radical
multiculturalist agenda, Farber and Sherry contend, is that polysemic
stories employed to achieve political goals are substituted for rational
argumentation subject to verification. If radicals tell stories about
(real-life or fictional) events in their lives and then sit around and
argue about the essential deep meaning of these stories, Farber and
Sherry are quite correct to bemoan this development. Patricia
Williams's infamous Benetton story has followed this unfortunate
trajectory, Farber and Sherry argue, because the point of the story
"remains obscure in part because of the paucity of explicit reasoning
connecting [it] to a clear conclusion." 1°6 The pseudo-literary fixation
on the Benetton story is regrettable and represents a shallow
reduction of the thesis that law is one of several socially constructed
narratives that constitute modern life. The philosophical importance
of the narrative movement is not to encourage the telling of clever
literary stories and the critical parsing of them, but to emphasize how
scholarly discourse and legal discourse are both socially constructed
narratives that deny their rhetoricity with false claims to objectivity
and necessity. 7 To the extent that radicals simplistically conceive
of their scholarship as telling short stories and then discussing the
facts in favor of a political cause. But the feminist historian who testified for the government in
opposition to Rosenberg's testimony argues that the contretemps was brought on at least in part
by Rosenberg's own behavior. See Alice Kessler-Harris, Academic Freedom and Expert
Witnessing: A Response to Haskell and Levinson, 67 TEx. L. REV. 429, 430-31 (1988) (stating
that Rosenberg's surrebuttal testimony was a strongly partisan attack on Kessler-Harris's
scholarly abilities that misrepresented her work and painted an unfair picture of her as an
opportunistic idealogue, leading to the unfortunate name-calling and personal attacks by third
persons that followed).
106. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 86.
107. Richard Delgado's famous series of "Rodrigo Chronicles" might foster this mistaken
view about the implications of the narrative critique of Enlightenment models of rationality. See
RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND
RACE (1995). Delgado makes very strong and persuasive arguments, but he feels compelled to
embed them in rather superficial and uninteresting dramas that prove to be distracting, if not
downright irritating. The idea that conveying an argument within a heavily constructed "story"
remains true to the philosophical insights of the narrative movement is just wrongheaded, since
the philosophical thesis is that all discourse is narratively structured, not just expressly literary
undertakings. It is unnecessary to be the next Kafka in order to write about law; this is fortunate
since no law professor appears likely to assume this role.
On the other hand, by rejecting the traditional model of abstract legal scholarship and
choosing instead to communicate through an exchange of views by "characters," Delgado is able
to dramatize the fact that reason is social and argumentative, rather than disembodied and
"pure." Cf HANS-GEORG GADAMER, DIALOGUE AND DIALECTIC: EIGHT HERMENEUTICAL
STUDIES ON PLATO (P. Christopher Smith ed. & trans., 1980) (demonstrating that the Socratic
dialogues are important because they reveal the dialogic character of reason). What we can learn
from Delgado is that mainstream legal scholarship is composed of equally heavily constructed
stories that are distracting to many readers because of the clumsy rhetorical strategies they
employ to deny their own rhetoricity.
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meaning of the stories, they risk reinforcing the mistaken view that
there is an indeterminate storytelling realm that is distinct from the
reality about which they write, thereby adopting a very traditional
conception, that even Farber and Sherry are willing to endorse, of
stories as subsidiary complements to analytic reasoning.
10 8
Finally, any tendency by radicals to be dismissive toward traditional
scholars who lack access to the unique voice available only to
minority radicals certainly would be disappointing. One would hope
that the radicals would learn from the thesis of narrative construction
that, in principle, there can.be no privileged rules of discourse. This
is not to say that the radicals must conform their scholarship to the
majority discourse, but only that their work should speak to those
who engage it openly. Dismissive refusals to engage others in dialogue
by remaining silent or launching attacks, especially when issued from
the loftiest heights in academia, represent the worst forms of pseudo-
objectivism that the radicals profess to eradicate. Any examples
offered by Farber and Sherry of such closed attitudes toward
discourse would represent more of a relapse to modernist conceptions
of knowledge than an excess inherent in radical multiculturalism.
Farber and Sherry are no less guilty of this tendency; as I have argued
at length, they engage their targets only on their own Enlightenment-
based grounds and do not address openly the deep challenges issued
by radical multiculturalism even as they describe the dangers of the
radical philosophical program.
The perils of radical multiculturalism identified by Farber and
Sherry are either identified as perils simply because they deviate from
Enlightenment values or are very real perils that are not intrinsically
connected with the radical perspective. The loss of invariant history
and universal objective truth is not particularly distressing when the
very point of the critique under discussion is to challenge those
notions. Detecting an incipient anti-Semitism is not particularly
surprising either, when Enlightenment values are equated with
overcoming anti-Semitism. Finally, the degradation of scholarly
discourse poses legitimate concerns but, nevertheless, is not neces-
sarily tied to the philosophical underpinnings of radical multicul-
turalism. Although Farber and Sherry write intelligently about a
number of issues that should concern legal academics, they are
completely unpersuasive-almost tautological at points-in connecting
these issues to the rise of radical multiculturalism. In the end, one
suspects that Farber and Sherry are wholly unimpressed with the work
of the radicals that they have encountered, but that they choose to
108. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 122.
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attribute these failings to radical multiculturalism as a philosophical
program rather than to the capabilities of individual scholars. If they
had decided to criticize individual scholars, they might have made an
important contribution to current debates; by attempting to under-
mine radical multiculturalism as a philosophical perspective without
directly assessing its tenets, however, they have simply failed to join
the debates.
In the final part of this Book Review, I wish to take up the
question that Farber and Sherry avoid throughout the book: whether
it is plausible to embrace the theses of radical multiculturalism as a
critical perspective on the American legal system. The philosophical
commitments endorsed by the radicals do not necessarily translate
into the abandonment of reason in favor of relativism. They may
instead point to a new conception of human reason as a social process
always subject to bias and abuse even as it contains within itself the
resources for recognizing and working through such failings. Because
Farber and Sherry target the philosophy behind radical multicul-
turalism instead of exposing deficiencies in individual thinkers, I do
not attempt to rehabilitate any particular radical scholars. I am ready
to concede that the radicals (no less than other groups that challenge
a majority discourse) may contain within their ranks flamboyant
Sophists who strike provocative poses in order to garner a following
and fifteen minutes of fame. My claim is that the tenets of radical
multiculturalism provide a persuasive philosophical challenge to the
Enlightenment values that figure so prominently in the story that
Farber and Sherry weave, and that this challenge is an important step
in reclaiming reason in legal theory.
IV. RECLAIMING REASON IN LEGAL THEORY
The modernist attempt to get along with fewer than all of the
resources of human reasoning puts one in mind of the Midwestern
expression, "few bricks short of a load." It means cracked,
irrational. The modernist program of narrowing down our ar-
guments in the name of rationality was a few bricks short of a load.
To admit now that metaphor and story figure also in human
reasoning is to become more, not less, rational, because of putting
more of what persuades serious people under scrutiny. Modernism
was rigorous about part of reasoning and angrily irrational about
the rest.
-Donald N. McCloskey1°9
109. Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economic Expertise, in THE RECOVERY OF
RHETORIC: PERSUASIVE DISCOURSE AND DISCIPLINARITY IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 137, 146
1998]
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Reason must regain a strong voice in American legal scholarship.
Not reason in the narrow sense of pursuing rational truths, but reason
in the widest sense of wisely deliberating and making sound
judgments. If we seek to cultivate reason, then attention surely must
be given to the narrative structure of reason, which is woven into
social practices that embody asymmetrical power relationships. It is
equally clear, though, that the internal integrity of narrative structures
cannot be ignored. "Just telling stories," like engaging in "mere
political rhetoric," refers to an activity in which the scholar adopts an
ethical and epistemic comportment that is inconsistent with the
pursuit of independently formulated political ends by any available
means. This is just to say that reason is neither acontextual and
apodictic nor infinitely malleable in the hands of self-directing
subjects. Reason is not as definitive in such matters as we would like,
but neither is it as impotent as we fear.
The most remarkable aspect of Farber and Sherry's book is that
even as they characterize their targets as unsophisticated hacks who
propound absurd theories, they insist that radical multiculturalism
raises matters of grave importance-matters that they choose not to
address on the merits. If their opponents merit a response, they merit
one that is responsive. Not all radical multiculturalists are good
scholars, and certainly their enterprise is subject to important and
thoroughgoing challenges and criticisms. There are dangers lurking
within these radical theories, but it will serve us well to confront these
dangers openly and without fear and loathing. Like seasoned trial
lawyers, legal theorists interested in defending the possibility of legal
reasoning should believe that they can win their case without all of
the available evidence incontrovertibly supporting their strongest and
most hopeful claims.
I will offer only a brief sketch of one potential defense of
"postmodern reason." My defense is postmodern because it concedes
the force of the radical attack on the integrity of the rational subject
(inevitably cast as an upper-middle-class white male) as a surveyor of
objective truths, but it is also a defense of the possibility and
desirability of social reason. My argument is that the anti-Enlighten-
ment philosophical critique is correct, but that we need not consider
a rejection of the totalizing conception of rationality developed and
solidified in the Enlightenment period as a denial of the possibility of
enlightenment through the use of reason. To reclaim reason in legal
theory, it is necessary to abandon the narrow conception of rationality
(Richard H. Roberts & James M.M. Good eds., 1993) [hereinafter RECOVERY OF RHETORIC].
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that the radicals so doggedly target but also to avoid becoming
consumed by the deconstructive exuberance of critique.
Returning to the unanswered challenges posed by the Sophists may
be the best means of addressing the issues that Farber and Sherry
sidestep. As the communities of ancient Greece confronted their own
multicultural challenges, itinerant Sophists adopted the role of
professional provocateurs in challenging the conventions of each
community that they visited. As John Poulakos nicely summarizes,
"philosophers articulated positions while the Sophists provided only
op-positions."110 Such rootless oppositionism holds little appeal for
most scholars; thus, the opponents of postmodern, deconstructive, or
radically critical philosophical approaches find it convenient to brand
their adversaries as the new Sophists. But this does not tell the whole
story of the significance of the Sophists. Protagoras and Isocrates
offered a challenge to the nascent philosophical tradition given voice
by Plato and Aristotle by promoting rhetorical engagement in the
public square as an alternative logos that did not collapse into
relativism and endless deconstruction. n
In a much maligned fragment of text that survives only in the
rebuttals offered against it, Protagoras credits the Sophists with the
ability to make "the weaker account stronger," thereby raising the
specter of public discourse being overcome by the use of rhetorical
trickery to gain adherence to an inappropriate argument. However,
recent commentators contend that Protagoras was championing the
process of persuasion in which the dominant discourse of the day can
be dismantled to show that what appeared to be weaker arguments
are in fact better arguments for present purposes.12 Protagoras did
not seek singular rational truths in human affairs but began with a
conception of the world as constituted by dissoi logoi (contending
discourses) that can be resolved only as a matter of collective
judgment." 3  Similarly, Isocrates stood between the imperial
tradition of the Socratics and the wholly destructive attitudes of some
Sophists by according significant epistemic value to practical public
dialogue in which political questions are rhetorically tested. He
rejected the false hope that social issues could be resolved by recourse
to logic and truth, strictly construed, or that an invariant realm of
110. POULAKOS, supra note 3, at 189.
111. See, e.g., SCHIAPPA, supra note 3. The battle lines marked out by Protagoras and Plato
constitute, in very important ways, the enduring conflict of philosophy that now defines many
of the contemporary philosophical questions motivating some of the work by radical multicul-
turalists. See MARGOLIS, supra note 82, at 1-2, 62-71. Margolis contends that "Aristotle's
argument against Protagoras is the supreme feint that has inspired the defensive line for twenty-
five hundred years." Id. at 69.
112. See SCHIAPPA, supra note 3, at 103-16.
113. See id. at 92, 185.
1998]
33
Mootz: Between Truth and Provocation
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1998
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 10: 605
rationality could secure and stabilize the flux of human existence from
the "outside."' 4 Protagoras and Isocrates were the original social
constructionists: They embedded their teaching not in the individual
skill of the rhetor to trick her listeners about what is real but in the
communal process of creating the real in dialogue. In so doing they
provided an epistemic vision of rhetoric and discourse that anticipated
many of the philosophical tenets that gird the radical program.
Contemporary rhetorical philosophy revives these ancient insights
by describing argumentation as a social activity subject to an informal
logic that operates on the basis of presumed agreement and works
toward resolutions the merits of which are only probable rather than
certain."' Rhetorical practices are not the unavoidable poor cousins
of rational demonstration, however, inasmuch as rhetorical
engagement represents the very process of thinking and judging that
underlies all knowledge.
The theoretical point is that cognitive processes are not simply
anterior to argumentation, but, as anticipations of arguments,
they are themselves constituted by socially observable arguments.
In this sense, as the social constructivists emphasize, human
thinking is socially constituted .... The rhetoricians, in teaching
their pupils the skills of debate, were also teaching the skills of
thinking.
... [D]ialogue, with its immediate interruptions and contradic-
tions, can be seen as the process of thinking. . . . Therefore,
thinking can be seen as a social, argumentative process, rather
than a monological, individual one."
6
A rhetorical conception of law and society potentially opens
everything to questioning and rejection, but argumentation actually
proceeds only on the basis of extensive and widely shared presup-
positions ("commonplaces") and never proceeds ex nihilo.
Conceiving radical multiculturalism as part of the "rhetorical turn"
back to the Sophist conception of truth as a plurality of discourses
yields perspective and clarity. Much of the work by critical race
114. See POULAKOS, supra note 3, at 113-49.
115. For a variety of views on this "rhetorical turn" in philosophy, see generally THE
CRITICAL TURN: RHETORIC AND PHILOSOPHY IN POSTMODERN DISCOURSE (Ian Angus &
Lenore Langsdorf eds., 1993); RECOVERY OF RHETORIC, supra note 109; RHETORIC,
SOPHISTRY, PRAGMATISM (Stephen Mailloux ed., 1995); Jeffrey Bineham, Displacing Descartes:
Philosophical Hermeneutics and Rhetorical Studies, 27 PHIL. & RHETORIC 300 (1994); Richard
J. Burke, A Rhetorical Conception of Rationality, 6 INFORMAL LOGIC 17 (1984); and William
Kluback, The Implications of Rhetorical Philosophy, 5 LAw & PHIL. 315 (1986).
116. Michael Billig, Psychology, Rhetoric and Cognition, in RECOVERY OF RHETORIC, supra
note 109, at 124; see also HANS-GEORG GADAMER, To What Extent Does Language Preform
Thought?, in TRUTH AND METHOD 542 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald Marshall trans., Crossroad
2d ed. 1989) (1960).
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theorists, radical feminists and gaylegal scholars can be recast
productively in terms of the renewed theoretical interest in rhetorical
practices as an alternative to traditional philosophical discourse. The
radicals all seek to displace the conceit that law operates as a rational
enterprise, not by claiming that law is hopelessly irrational, but by
demonstrating that law often requires a reasonable judgment as
between two or more logically acceptable resolutions of a given issue.
The radical critique discloses connections between the seemingly
"natural" presuppositions of judgment by tracing them to constitutive
social processes that embody contingent and debatable beliefs about,
inter alia, race, gender, and sexual orientation. It is easy to brand the
radicals as the new Sophists; it requires a far more nuanced approach
to assess whether the radicals play out the Sophistic tradition in a
productive manner and to remain willing to respond to their efforts.
If multiculturalist thinkers were to claim that they have gained access
to a new "truth" about the "natural" arrangement of social relations,
they would repeat the Enlightenment fantasy, but by offering
arguments that support better conceptions of social life and reveal the
unproductive presuppositions shaping current discourse, they enter the
rhetorical arena first described by Protagoras and Isocrates.
If multiculturalism is understood as an acknowledgment of
pluralism rather than a surrender to balkanization, critical deconstruc-
tions of entrenched social conceptions do not necessarily devolve into
an irrational power play by one group against another. Under
conditions of pluralism, persuasion is predicated on rhetorical
inventions that are a form of social reason, exhibiting what might be
termed a "strong hermeneutics. '7 If social life is neither a manifes-
tation of competing camps locked in a noncommunicative struggle for
power nor a homogeneous community bound (meaning both joined
and constrained) by ahistorical rationality, then there is a
demonstrable need for modern-day Sophists who can facilitate the
hermeneutical appropriation and rhetorical elaboration of an
inherited, diverse tradition. Contemporary scholars who investigate
law in a "radical" manner-in the sense of exploring the root of legal
experience and understanding rather than merely advocating for
extreme political change-have developed a multicultural account of
the human condition that serves this end. Radical multiculturalism
begins with the recognition that alterity (otherness) and commonality
117. Cf. NICHOLAS H. SMITH, STRONG HERMENEUTICS: CONTINGENCY AND MORAL
IDENTITY (1997) (arguing that the ontological approaches of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Charles
Taylor, and Paul Ricoeur succeed in developing an ethical theory that overcomes Enlightenment
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(unity) are irreducible and eradicable features of social life that
remain in constant dynamic tension, and it concludes with the
commitment to face this tension as openly as possible.'18 Rhetorical
trickery may exploit the tension on occasion, but rhetorical
engagement is our only means of mediating the tension.
The rhetorical engagement that radical multiculturalism seeks to
foster need not be characterized as strategic behavior by individuals,
for it is the commitment to a view of rhetoric as a social activity that
places the radical multiculturalists between the Enlightenment
ideology of truth-finding and the postmodern ideology of rootless
provocation. Emerging from the flux of lived existence and the
preunderstandings embedded in patterns of social discourse and
interaction, rhetorical inventions produce new understandings in a
way that habits and customs do not. Postmodern skepticism is avoided
by recognizing that decentered agents, who are engaged in ongoing
communicative exchanges and meaning-laden actions that traverse
various discourses and repertoires of behavior, are underwriting
subjective experience only by constantly renewing shared meanings.
We can put to rest the relativistic fears raised by Protagoras's claim
that "man is the measure of all things" by emphasizing that "man"
need not be read as an insular individual who rises above all claims
to objective truth. Instead, a provocative reading emerges when we
construe "man" as a plural noun encompassing all of humanity.119
Multiculturalism is not a collapse into a relativistic chaos of incom-
118. Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is devoted in large part to this project,
addressing this tension as it exists diachronically and synchronically within a culture, as well as
in the cross-cultural encounters that accelerated with the advent of modem colonization by the
West and blossomed with the so-called age of globalization. See Fred R. Dallmayr, Self and
Other: Gadamer and the Hermeneutics of Difference, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 507 (1993). See
generally FRED DALLMAYR, BEYOND ORIENTALISM: ESSAYS ON CROSS-CULTURAL
ENCOUNTER (1996) (developing a Gadamerian model of cross-cultural encounter that does not
hypostatize global uniformity nor surrender to radical perspectivism). Working from Gadamer's
premises, Richard Bernstein summarizes this project as one of the central features of ethical-
political practice and theory in the postmodern age.
We can never escape the real practical possibility that we will fail to do justice to the
alterity of "the Other." But the response to the threat to this practical failure should be an
ethical one-to assume the responsibility to acknowledge, appreciate and not to violate the
alterity of "the Other." ... We must resist the dual temptation of either facilely assimilating
the alterity of "the Other" to what is "the Same" . . . or simply dismissing (or repressing)
the alterity of "the Other" as being of no significance-"merely" contingent.... It makes
no sense to even speak of a "final solution" to this problem-the problem of human living.
No one can ever fully anticipate the ruptures and new sites of the upsurgence of alterity.
This is a lesson that we must learn again and again. And it has been painfully experienced
in our time whenever those individuals or groups who have been colonized, repressed, or
silenced rise up and assert the legitimacy and demand for full recognition of their own non-
reducible alterity
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, THE NEW CONSTELLATION: THE ETHICAL-POLITICAL HORIZONS OF
MODERNITY/POSTMODERNITY 74-75 (MIT Press 1992) (paragraph numbering omitted).
119. See Tom Cohen, The "Genealogies" of Pragmatism, in RHETORIC, SOPHISTRY.
PRAGMATISM, supra note 115, at 94, 107.
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mensurable group identities, but rather a confrontation with the social
construction of the world in which we continually participate and that
girds the experience of subjectivity.
Claims for recognition by those who effectively have been
silenced-and can anyone seriously doubt that women, racial
minorities and homosexuals are (differently) silenced?-proceed from
presuppositions that they share with those who do the silencing, or
the claims would not be heard. Radical multiculturalism, as the
practice and theory of rhetorical invention, challenges only by drawing
upon deep-seated, communal agreements that largely remain tacit
even in the midst of vigorous criticism. There is no inconsistency in
the fact that many radicals recycle familiar ideas in the course of their
criticisms, for that is the essence of rhetorical argumentation and
critical thinking. The important point is that the radicals, like the
Sophists of old, demonstrate that familiar formulas can be disrupted
and rendered alien and opaque as a prelude to offering new accounts
that rest more firmly on evolving shared conceptions.12 ° A difficulty
arises, though, if the radicals abandon persuasive argumentation in a
fruitless quest for a complete break with the status quo. It is this
temptation that threatens to draw radicals beyond all reason.
One of the most interesting radical legal theorists today is Pierre
Schlag, a trenchant postmodernist who meets many of Farber and
Sherry's defining criteria for radical multiculturalism and who
therefore carries forward the deconstructive mission of the Sophists.
I have criticized Schlag's radicalism for devolving into a self-devouring
critique that ultimately undermines the attack on Enlightenment
values with which he begins; I argue that he tends to be a Sophistic
provocateur more than a proponent of a rhetorical logos. This critique
is most strongly voiced in an essay in which I argued that Schlag
adopts what I characterize as a "paranoid style" of analysis in his
effort to overcome normative thinking and discourse, a charac-
terization that closely anticipated similar charges made by Farber and
Sherry against the radical multiculturalists. 2 ' But my critique of
Schlag is worlds away from Farber and Sherry's critique of the
radicals: I am arguing on behalf of the best contemporary reading of
the Sophistic legacy, while Farber and Sherry champion the En-
lightenment rejection of the Sophistic legacy. This distinction is wholly
ignored in their book. If certain radicals, like Schlag, provide
unpersuasive accounts of the task of legal theory and the situation of
120. See CALVIN 0. SCHRAG, THE RESOURCES OF RATIONALITY: A RESPONSE TO THE
POSTMODERN CHALLENGE 136-40 (1992).
121. See Francis J. Mootz III, The Paranoid Style in Contemporary Legal Scholarship, 31
Hous. L. REV. 873 (1994).
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contemporary legal actors, it will not do to reject out-of-hand the
general critical presuppositions from which they are working; these
presuppositions are insightful and should be engaged directly, even if
they have been developed in less-than-satisfactory ways. Moreover,
the project of reclaiming reason in legal practice requires the critical
rejection of the narrow Enlightenment conception of rationality
without succumbing to paranoid excesses. Schlag's legal theory is far
more nuanced and realistic than Farber and Sherry's traditionalist
fantasy of just getting the facts right and then acting rationally,
despite his efforts to escape completely from the "maze" of normative
discourse that just is the human condition.
Farber and Sherry are well aware of the danger that lurks in the
murky middle ground that I am attempting to survey. Lacking the
safety net of the Enlightenment model of discourse, they ask how
scholarly discourse can proceed. More specifically, they might ask how
my dispute with Schlag can be adjudicated if we both adhere to the
thesis that we live in a socially constructed world infused with power
practices that provides no firm ground of historical fact or objectivity
from which truth is apprehended. But addressing this fear is precisely
the point of my dispute with Schlag: I argue that argumentation is
logos, and that contingent structures constructed within the flux of
human existence provide sufficient resources for the continuing
project of social reason. The rhetorical means of crafting and judging
arguments are available because of, not in spite of, cultural
heterogeneity and historical contingency. The purpose of dialogue
under these conditions is not that far removed from the purpose of
dialogue under the Enlightenment conception. Instead of serving as
an external check on our individual ability to amass and assess all
relevant facts in a rational manner, dialogue is the social process by
which we construct, maintain, and assess the "facts" (e.g., the situation
of working women and the problems of discrimination) in a
reasonable manner. Whereas the Enlightenment approach tends to
hide this social process under the rationalist rug, evidencing what
Gadamer has termed the "prejudice against prejudice itself, which
denies tradition its power," '122 the radical challenge to the Enlighten-
ment model embraces the contingent (or "prejudiced") social starting
point of reason and brings this unavoidable process within the scope
of debate.
The project of reexamining the social process of rhetorically
constructed knowledge does not require a neutral investigator able to
take an objectifying view of others (as championed in the Enlighten-
122. GADAMER, supra note 116, at 270.
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ment era); neither does it necessarily collapse into solipsism or mere
assertions backed by power. Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy is
prominently linked to the attack on Enlightenment ideals, but
Gadamer finds in this antifoundationalist situation a simultaneous
reinforcement of the diversity of life and of the operation of reason
in discourse. Gadamer writes that "hermeneutic philosophy
understands itself not as an absolute position but as a way of
experience. It insists that there is no higher principle than holding
oneself open in a conversation." '123 This is not an idealist plea
informed by an ethical vision; it is an ontological claim about our
situation in the post-Enlightenment world. Rhetoric is not just a tool
used strategically by self-directing individuals, for underlying any such
strategic behavior is a social experience in which one engages in a
practical deliberation, whether it be politics, law, or literary criticism.
The radicalism of the social constructionist attack on calcified notions
of truth and objectivity is its call to place these dialogically secured
conceptions in dispute by broadening the scope of rhetorical practices.
Therefore, when a prominent critical race theorist rebukes me for
criticizing his angry and accusatorial tone and asserts that he need not
write just for the white professoriate,'24 I do not see an example of
radical multiculturalism run amok, but rather the self-satisfaction of
Enlightenment ideology grafted onto a dissembling intellectual
culture. In other words, I see the worst of both worlds.
If reason and truth do not stand outside the flux of human
existence, then it is within the flux itself that we shall recover reason
as a fact of our social existence. The contemporary debate about the
literary canon is an apt synecdoche for the distinctions that I am
attempting to draw.125 Radical critics undoubtedly are correct to
argue that the canon of "great literary works" is indelibly stamped
with the history of oppression, bias, and ignorance. Nevertheless, the
very mode of critical thinking that impeaches the canon is itself
deeply shaped by canonical forces. This paradox is explained by the
fact that socially constructed reality cannot be demolished in a day
and replaced by completely different structures. Social construction is
an ongoing project that can be only modestly facilitated or hindered
123. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, On the Origins of Philosophical Hermeneutics, in
PHILOSOPHICAL APPRENTICESHIPS 189 (Robert K. Sullivan trans., 1985); see also supra note 118.
124. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Telling a Black Legal Story: Privilege, Authenticity,
"Blunders," and Transformation in Outsider Narratives, 82 VA. L. REV. 169, 193 n.3 (1996)
(criticizing Francis J. Mootz III, Legal Classics: After Deconstructing the Legal Canon, 72 N.C.
L. REV. 977, 998-99 (1993), and claiming that I have a "difficult time grasping" the point of legal
narrative and that I do not recognize that not all legal writing "can or should be directed at the
white majority").
125. See generally Mootz, supra note 124 (providing a Gadamerian analysis of the "canon
debate" and its relevance to legal theory).
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by applying a theoretical understanding of how the construction
proceeds. The literary canon does not provide a universal rule of
evaluation that determines in advance which texts are meritorious, but
it does constitute a bounded cultural arena within which an evolving
process of judgment takes place. The literary canon is not a timeless
list of masterpieces that might occasionally be supplemented; instead,
it is a shifting repertoire of normative exemplars necessary to the
ongoing maintenance of public life. Denying essentialism and timeless
objectivity should focus attention on processes of cultural sedimen-
tation that never are completed and always remain subject to
challenge rather than devolving into an "anything goes" anarchy of
irrational preferences. The same holds true for radical multicul-
turalism in legal theory: Radically disrupting the claims of necessity
and naturalness used to justify the dominant discourse does not
eradicate meaning; it cultivates an appreciation of the wider field of
narrative play from which meaning emerges.
My claim that radical multiculturalism provides a plausible means
of recovering the operation of reason within the rhetorical construc-
tion of social narratives is best explored by considering an example.
Farber and Sherry characterize William Eskridge's endorsement of
"gaylegal narratives" as a deviation from reasoned discourse, but a
close reading of the text that they criticize underscores my theme.
Eskridge uses the Perry Watkins case against the Army's policy of
discriminating against homosexuals as a means of exploring different
approaches to law.'26 He first describes and rejects the "conservative
pragmatism" that Farber and Sherry embody, arguing that it permits
only incremental changes within currently dominant patterns of
thought. He then argues that a "social constructionist" view of the
nature of human existence and social institutions is a better means of
assessing the Watkins case.
Social constructionists study and support the liberatory counter-
movements created by people marginalized by dividing practices
[that purport to be "neutral," if not "natural"]. Such groups must
first identify the practices oppressing them, then come to
understand that the practices are socially constructed rather than
natural, and finally create their own consciousness of resis-
tance.12
7
Given the instability of socially constructed norms, the radical theorist
seeks a "rupture" with prevalent modes of thinking and a "conceptual
126. See Eskridge, supra note 57 (discussing Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329
(9th Cir. 1988), vacated, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc)).
127. Id. at 635.
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reorientation" that amounts to a renegotiation of certain features of
social life. 12' The story told in the Watkins case will vary depending
upon the strategy adopted, with a social constructionist perspective
leading to a story that undermines rigid gender and sexual orientation
categories and a more conservative story culminating in a legislative
compromise such as "don't ask, don't tell."
It is important to understand that Eskridge is not attempting to
launch a wholesale revolution in thinking according to a script that
can be imposed on society from "outside" its traditionary prejudices.
Such a massive conceptual reorientation would be beyond rupture; it
would amount to repudiation. But Eskridge well understands that
repudiation of this magnitude would require a subject powerful
enough to escape the social determinants of life-in other words, the
very subject presumed in Enlightenment ideology. Eskridge's
understanding of the contextual operation of radical theory is clearly
evident when he compares the contemporary situation of gays in the
military to the situation of blacks in the military prior to World War
II; his radical claim is that socially constructed reality once again can
undergo a major revision.
The story of the military's racial desegregation illustrates the
possibility of rupture in old thought patterns .... In General
Colin Powell's terms, while race is now "benign" in that it is not
thought to disrupt unit cohesion, sexual orientation remains
"fundamental," in that it is perceived to be disruptive. But
Powell's distinction between "benign" and "fundamental" is
socially created rather than natural; after all, race was considered
"fundamental" less than fifty years ago.
Social construction teaches that what was once fundamentally
divisive can become benign.'29
As a sophisticated radical thinker, Eskridge does not purport to have
the final word on the proper contours of social relations. After
pretenses to neutrality and timeless truths have fallen away, per-
suasive argumentation in a changing and indeterminate social sphere
remains. He readily admits that "constructed dividing practices
["prejudices" in Gadamer's terminology] permeate society" and that
"some such practices may be legitimate," but he insists that this
acknowledgment does not disable efforts to distinguish "productive"
practices from "oppressive" practices in an argumentative forum that
does not suffer the authoritarian compelling force of logic and pure
rationality."3 °
128. Id. at 641-44.
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The theory of social constructionism leads Eskridge to advocate
vigorous rhetorical challenges within a public sphere. There is no
escape from the social situation in which Perry Watkins finds himself,
but there are rhetorical means for reshaping this situation through
argumentative appeals. In the end, Eskridge admits, "rupture needs
to be followed by reintegrating new and old scripts."'' Eskridge
continues: "The multiplication of voices may threaten American law
with cacophony, but it also challenges scholars to orchestrate a richer
legal symphony."' 32 Recognizing that reality is a socially constructed
plurality in both its legal and nonlegal elements is liberating, but it
also amounts to a recognition that the timeworn hope for complete
liberation from the flux of the human condition is no more available
to the radical multiculturalist than it is to the adherent of Enlighten-
ment rationalism. If Eskridge is touting radical multiculturalism with
this line of analysis, it is difficult to understand why Farber and
Sherry attribute such dire consequences to its ascendancy in legal
theory.
Farber and Sherry fall short of their stated goal to impeach radical
multiculturalism as an expression of an implausible philosophy that
yields dangerous political tendencies. Although the social construction
of reality and the contestable nature of truth and history appear to be
frightening and nearly absurd ideas at first glance, careful work by a
number of scholars in many disciplines proves that we have much less
to fear than is generally supposed. There is nothing to be gained from
yet another attempt to suppress the Sophistic alternative to rationally
determined and univocal truths; knee-jerk denials hold no power over
an examination of how we live and interact in society. Reality is
socially constructed-history and truth are narratively structured and
rhetorically negotiated-but reasonable appeals and judgments are
possible within this postmodern situation. The sooner that we
acknowledge that reason is inextricably bound up with the theses that
Farber and Sherry characterize as radical multiculturalism, the sooner
we will be able to reclaim reason in American legal theory. Farber
and Sherry's instinctual fear of radical multiculturalism brings to mind
Lon Fuller's retort to theorists afraid to abandon the (still) deeply
entrenched bifurcation of fact and value in traditional philosophical
discourse: "Some people feel great discomfort in the presence of
[such] a [radical] view ... But it is suggested this discomfort is really
the discomfort of being alive."' 33
131. Id. at 644.
132. Id. at 646. Farber and Sherry quote Eskridge out of context and mislead their readers
into believing that Eskridge favors jettisoning our legal heritage in its entirety, a ridiculous
notion for any social constructionist to entertain. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 16.
133. L.L. Fuller, The Philosophy of Codes of Ethics, 74 ELEC. ENG'G 916, 917 (1955).
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